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Abstract
In 2004 and 2005, long-term interest rates remained remarkably low despite improving
economic conditions and rising short-term interest rates, a situation that former Fed
Chairman Alan Greenspan dubbed a ￿conundrum.￿We document the extent and tim-
ing of this conundrum using two empirical no-arbitrage macro-￿nance models of the
term structure of interest rates. These models con￿rm that the recent behavior of long-
term yields has been unusual￿ that is, it cannot be explained within the framework
of the models. Therefore, we consider other macroeconomic factors omitted from the
models and ￿nd that some of these variables, particularly declines in long-term bond
volatility, may explain a portion of the conundrum. Foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S
Treasuries appear to have played little or no role.
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1[L]ong-term interest rates have trended lower in recent months even as the Federal Reserve
has raised the level of the target federal funds rate by 150 basis points. This development
contrasts with most experience, which suggests that, other things being equal, increasing short-
term interest rates are normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields... For the
moment, the broadly unanticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum.
￿ Testimony of Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan to U.S. Senate, February 16, 2005
1 Introduction
As a broad empirical regularity, long-term interest rates tend to move month-by-month in
the same direction as short-term rates, although by a lesser amount. In the Unted States, the
simple correlation since 1984 between changes in short-term and long-term rates implies that
a 1 percentage point increase in the monthly federal funds rate has been accompanied, on
average, by about a 30-basis-point increase in the 10-year rate. However, in 2004 and 2005,
long-term interest rates in many countries followed a very di⁄erent pattern. For example,
in the United States, while the federal funds rate steadily rose from 1 percent in June 2004
to 4.2 percent in December 2005, the rate on 10-year U.S. Treasury notes fell from 4.7
percent to 4.5 percent over that same period.1 This directional divergence between U.S.
short and long rates appears even more unusual given other pressures at the time, such as a
robust economic expansion, rising energy prices, and a deteriorating federal ￿scal situation,
all of which have tended to boost long-term interest rates in the past. In this paper, we
investigate the seemingly odd behavior of long-term interest rates over this recent episode,
a development which former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan has labeled a ￿conundrum.￿ 2
Determining whether recent long-terminterest rate movements truly represent a conundrum￿
as opposed to simply an extension of secular declines in long-term interest rates that have
been taking place over the past 20 years￿ requires a rigorous theoretical framework that can
1 In addition, given the upward shifts in money market futures rates during 2005, the extent of the policy
tightening appears to have been unanticipated.
2 Although Greenspan referred to ￿world￿bond markets, our focus is exclusively on U.S. markets. For
discussion of recent bond rates in Japan from a macro-￿nance perspective, see Oda and Ueda (2005).
2take into account the important factors that a⁄ect long-term rates. Our choice of a theo-
retical framework for this examination is guided by much recent research that suggests that
a joint macro-￿nance modeling strategy provides the most comprehensive explanation of
movements in long-term rates.3 From a macroeconomic perspective, the short-term interest
rate is a policy instrument under the direct control of the central bank, which adjusts that
rate to achieve its economic stabilization goals. Therefore, ￿nancial market participants￿un-
derstanding of central bank behavior will be an important element in the formation of their
expectations of future short-term interest rates, which, in turn, will be a key component for
the pricing of longer-term bonds. To illustrate this point, it is useful to contrast the recent
behavior of U.S. interest rates to their behavior during the previous episode of extended
monetary tightening, which occurred a decade earlier. Speci￿cally, from January 1994 to
February 1995, as the Federal Reserve raised the short-term federal funds rate by 3 percent-
age points, the 10-year rate also rose by 1.7 percentage points. This reaction was somewhat
greater than the average response, and a common interpretation of this episode is that bond
investors were especially worried that in￿ ation pressures might not be counteracted by the
Fed in a timely fashion. In contrast, there is a widespread view that long-term in￿ ation
expectations remained well contained in 2004 and 2005,which helped hold down long bond
rates. Understanding the di⁄erential behavior of long-term interest rates during these two
episodes likely requires an appreciation of the macroeconomic underpinnings of bond rate
dynamics.
A ￿nance perspective, which stresses the importance of changing investor perceptions of
risk for bond pricing, is also likely to be a crucial element in assessing whether there is any
bond rate conundrum. Indeed, many have suggested that a reduction in the risk premium
is responsible for recent low levels of bond rates. Such a reduction may be attributable
to changes in the amount of risk or to changes in the pricing of that risk, and numerous
3 The connection between the macroeconomic and ￿nance views of the term structure has been a very
fertile area for recent research including, among many others, Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Wu (2001), Dewachter
and Lyrio (2006), Evans and Marshall (2001), Diebold, Rudebusch, and Aruoba (2006), H￿rdahl, Tristani,
and Vestin (2006), Rudebusch and Wu (2004, 2006), Kozicki and Tinsley (2001, 2005), and Diebold, Piazzesi,
and Rudebusch (2005).
3factors have been suggested that could have induced such changes. For example, a new
appreciation of lower macroeconomic volatility or reduced monetary policy uncertainty could
alter assessments of the amount of interest rate risk faced by investors. Alternatively, risk
aversion may have been reduced as new global investors entered the market. Indeed, this is
one interpretation of the explanation suggested by Bernanke (2005), who argued that ￿over
the past decade a combination of diverse forces has created a signi￿cant increase in the global
supply of saving￿ a global saving glut￿ which helps to explain both the increase in the U.S.
current account de￿cit and the relatively low level of long-term real interest rates in the
world today.￿In any case, it is likely important to allow for time variation in risk premiums
in understanding the recent behavior of the bond rate.
To conduct our analysis of the ￿conundrum,￿we use two macro-￿nance models of the
term structure from the literature. The ￿rst is a VAR-based model developed by Bernanke,
Reinhart, and Sack (2005), denoted BRS, and the second is a New-Keynesian-based model
developed by Rudebusch and Wu (2004), denoted RW. The BRS and RW models share
several basic features. First, they are both factor models, so only a small number of sources
of variation underlie the pricing of the entire term structure of interest rates. Second, both
models impose the standard no-arbitrage restriction from ￿nance (e.g., Du¢ e and Kan 1996),
which ensures that, after accounting for risk, the dynamic evolution of yields over time and
across states of nature is consistent with the cross-sectional shape of the yield curve at
any one point in time. Finally, both models have important bi-directional linkages between
interest rates and macroeconomic variables. However, despite their broad similarities, the
BRS and RW models also have technical speci￿cations that di⁄er in important ways. Because
these di⁄erences may lead to di⁄erent results, we use both models in our analysis in order
to provide us with additional perspective and robustness checks on our results.
By extending these models forward from their original samples to the 2004￿ 2005 ￿co-
nundrum￿ period, we can determine whether the fall in long-term bond yields over that
period was unusual from the viewpoint of the models, as opposed to a continuation of secu-
lar declines in long-term interest rates and term premiums that have been taking place since
4the early 1980s. Our analysis indicates that the level of long-term bond yields in 2004 and
2005 is, in fact, substantially lower than can be explained by either of these models￿ i.e.,
that this period does constitute a ￿conundrum￿from a macro-￿nance perspective.
Having documented the existence of a conundrum within a rigorous econometric frame-
work, we then turn to possible explanations for the conundrum￿ factors that necessarily lie
outside of the two macro-￿nance models we have considered. We examine a number of pop-
ular explanations for the conundrum that have been promoted by ￿nancial analysts and ￿nd
that one of them￿ lower volatility of long-term Treasury yields￿ seems to have substantial
explanatory power. Interestingly, we ￿nd no support for the view that foreign o¢ cial pur-
chases of U.S. Treasuries have contributed to the low level of long-term yields, even though
this factor is regarded by many ￿nancial market participants to have been the single most
important factor holding down long-term U.S. Treasury yields.
Although there are numerous papers specifying ￿nance and macro-￿nance models of the
term structure, our paper ￿lls a gap in the literature by applying these models to analyze
the bond yield ￿conundrum.￿The most closely related paper to the present one is Kim and
Wright (2005), who use a pure ￿nance three-factor model of the term structure to analyze
the recent low level of long-term rates, and ￿nd that a declining term premium is the key
factor underlying those low rates. By contrast, we use two macro-￿nance models of the term
structure and ￿nd that, within the framework of these models, there is in fact a conundrum￿
that the model-implied term premiums from our two models are unable to explain the low
level of long-term yields observed in 2004￿ 2005, despite the fact that the models provide an
otherwise excellent ￿t to the data over the previous 20 years.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the BRS and
RW macro-￿nance models of the term structure. In Section 3, we discuss the estimation of
these models and use them to show that there was a bond yield conundrum in the 2004￿
2005 period. In Section 4, we investigate what other factors outside of the two models could
potentially help to explain the bond yield conundrum episode. Section 5 concludes.
52 Macro-Finance Models of the Term Structure
To investigate whether and to what extent the low level of U.S. long-term interest rates
can be explained by macroeconomic conditions, we will use two macro-￿nance models of
the term structure, broadly following Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Piazzesi (2005), and many
others. For analyzing the behavior of the yield curve, these macro-￿nance models o⁄er a
number of advantages over both pure ￿nance models and pure macroeconomic models.
First, in contrast to standard ￿nance models of the term structure (e.g., Dai and Sin-
gleton, 2000), which relate the yield curve to current and past interest rates, macro-￿nance
models recognize that interest rates and macroeconomic variables evolve jointly over time,
with feedback running from interest rates to macroeconomic variables and also from macro-
economic variables back to interest rates. The latter channel in particular is crucial for the
behavior of short-term interest rates, which are determined in many countries by the cen-
tral bank as a function of the state of macroeconomic variables such as the output gap and
in￿ ation.4
A second advantage of macro-￿nance models is that they allow the behavior of risk
premiums to depend explicitly on macroeconomic conditions. Standard consumption-based
models of asset returns imply that risk premiums are determined by the covariance of an
asset￿ s return with the marginal utility of consumption (e.g., Cochrane, 2001). Moreover,
empirical studies of excess returns in bond markets and shorter-duration interest rate deriv-
atives (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005, and Piazzesi and Swanson, 2004) ￿nd a strong coun-
tercyclical relationship between economic activity and excess returns on these securities,
particularly during recessions. Macro-￿nance models of the term structure explicitly allow
for a relationship between risk premiums and macroeconomic conditions.
A third advantage of macro-￿nance models is that, in contrast to standard macroeconomic
models, a substantial component of observed bond yields is allowed to re￿ ect term or risk
4 While a reduced-form relationship between past interest rates and the future behavior of short-term
interest rates exists, the Lucas critique suggests that it may be unstable in the face of changing monetary
policy. A macro-￿nance approach that models monetary policy is arguably less subject to this criticism.
Kim and Wright (2005), who examine the recent conundrum with a standard ￿nance model, may alleviate
this problem by using a fairly short estimation sample (since 1990).
6premiums that may vary substantially over time. Indeed, as in a ￿nance model, macro-￿nance
models allow term premiums to evolve according to the estimated dynamics of the model in a
way that is consistent with an absence of arbitrage opportunities in ￿nancial markets. Thus,
while macro-￿nance models of the term structure retain the appealing macroeconometric
features of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model or a vector autoregression
(VAR), they do not impose the expectations hypothesis and can allow for a rich behavior of
term premiums.
To explore the recent behavior of long-term bond rates, we use two macro-￿nance mod-
els from the literature, the VAR-based model developed in Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack
(2005) and the more structural New Keynesian-based model developed in Rudebusch and
Wu (2004). We discuss each in turn.
2.1 Bernanke-Reinhart-Sack Model
The BRS model uses ￿ve observable macroeconomic variables, speci￿ed below, as factors
with which to ￿t the yield curve. The dynamics of the ￿ve factors are governed by a VAR
with four lags, which can be stacked into the 20-element vector Xt and described by a VAR(1)
model:
Xt = ￿ + ￿Xt￿1 + ￿"t; (1)
where the stochastic shocks "t are i.i.d. over time and have a standard normal distribution.
Consistent with the companion form speci￿cation in (1), only the uppermost blocks of ￿
and ￿ are nontrivial. For simplicity, the prices of risk in the model, speci￿ed below, are
assumed to load only on the ￿ve current values of the macroeconomic variables (i.e., the top
￿ve elements of Xt).
Following Du¢ e and Kan (1996), Dai and Singleton (2000), and Ang and Piazzesi (2003),
among others, we assume that the stochastic discount factor with which bonds in the model
7are priced is conditionally log-normal with functional form:5





where ￿t is a 20-dimensional vector of market prices of risk associated with the innovations to
the VAR, "t. Of course, because only the ￿rst ￿ve elements of "t are nonzero, we assume that
only the ￿rst ￿ve elements of ￿t are nonzero, which is essentially a normalization. Following
the papers cited above, the market prices of risk ￿t are assumed to be a¢ ne functions of the
state variables of the economy:
￿t = ￿0 + ￿1Xt; (3)
where ￿0 is a 20-dimensional vector of constants and ￿1 is a 20-by-20 matrix of risk price
factor loadings on the state variables Xt. As mentioned above, we assume for simplicity that
the prices of risk depend only on the current values of the variables in Xt, thus only the
upper-left 5-by-5 block of ￿1 is nonzero.
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where a0 = 0, b0 = 0, and an (a scalar) and bn (a 5-by-1 vector) are computed recursively
according to:
an+1 = ￿0 + an + b
0




bn+1 = ￿1 + (￿ ￿ ￿￿1)
0bn;
5 It is a well-known and important result from ￿nance that the assumption of no arbitrage (or even more
weakly, the law of one price) implies that a stochastic discount factor must exist, even in an incomplete
market￿ see, e.g., Cochrane (2001) for discussion. The papers cited here place the additional functional
form restriction on the pricing kernel for tractability.
8and where ￿0 (a scalar) and ￿1 (a 5-by-1 vector) describe the one-period interest rate as a
function of the state of the economy: y1




The RW model shares many features with the BRS model, since both models price bonds
using an a¢ ne no-arbitrage framework. Thus, for expositional simplicity and to conserve
notation, when concepts in the two models are the same, we will take the corresponding
variable name from the BRS model exposition above and recycle it in the description of the
RW model below (even though the number of factors, and hence the number of dimensions, in
the two models are di⁄erent). Note that, despite the similarity in the bond-pricing framework,
the dynamics of the underlying macroeconomic factors in the RW model di⁄er in important
ways from BRS, with RW using a more structural New Keynesian macroeconomic framework
to model these dynamic relationships as opposed to a VAR.
Bond pricing in the RW model is governed by the same a¢ ne no-arbitrage framework in
(2)￿ (6) described above. However, in contrast to the BRS model, the RW model de￿nes the
one-period interest rate to be a sum of two latent factors, Lt and St:
it = ￿0 + Lt + St; (7)
where Lt can be thought of as the ￿level￿of the yield curve and St as (the negative of)
the yield curve ￿slope,￿as discussed in Rudebusch and Wu (2004).6 Intuitively, the Federal
Reserve sets the one-period nominal interest rate in the model as the sum of a constant
steady-state real interest rate (￿0), a time-varying medium- to long-term in￿ ation rate (Lt),
and a cyclically responsive component St that is given by:
St = ￿SSt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿S)[gyyt + g￿(￿t ￿ Lt)] + uS;t; (8)
uS;t = ￿uuS;t￿1 + "S;t; (9)
6 Rudebusch and Wu (2004) present charts comparing their estimated values for Lt and St to traditional
principal components decompositions of the yield curve into ￿level￿and ￿slope￿factors, and show that the
two sets of series line up very closely, justifying the use of the terminology.
9where yt is the output gap and ￿t the in￿ ation rate. Equation (8) is essentially a Taylor
(1993) rule for the short-term rate it with both inertia (through the lag St￿1) and serially
correlated errors (as described by Rudebusch 2002b).
The dynamics of Lt are given by:
Lt = ￿LLt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿L)￿t + "L;t; (10)
which says that the medium-term in￿ ation goal is persistent but may depend also on the
recent behavior of short-term in￿ ation, as suggested by the evidence in G￿rkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2005).
The latent factors Lt and St are jointly determined with the macroeconomic variables yt
and ￿t by a New Keynesian-type model (adjusted to apply to monthly data):
￿t = ￿￿Lt + (1 ￿ ￿￿)[￿￿1￿t￿1 + ￿￿2￿t￿2] + ￿yyt￿1 + "￿;t (11)
yt = ￿yEtyt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿y)[￿y1yt￿1 + ￿y2yt￿2] ￿ ￿r(it￿1 ￿ Lt￿1) + "y;t. (12)
That is, in￿ ation responds to the private sector￿ s expectation of the medium-term in￿ ation
goal (Lt), two lags of in￿ ation, and the output gap; the output gap, in turn, responds to the
expected future output gap, two lags of the output gap, and a real interest rate. Equations
(11) and (12) are ￿hybrid￿New Keynesian equations in the sense that the expectational
coe¢ cients ￿￿ and ￿y are allowed to be less than unity when the model is ￿tted to the data.
3 Is There a Bond Yield ￿Conundrum￿ ?
To investigate whether the recent low level of U.S. long-term bond yields is a conundrum from
a macro-￿nance perspective, we use the BRS and RW models to ￿t the recent macroeconomic
and interest rate data and examine the two model predictions for long-term bond yields.
103.1 Model Estimates
3.1.1 BRS Model Estimates
Our original inclination was to use the ￿o⁄-the-shelf￿BRS model parameter estimates for
our analysis. However, after examining the data and model estimation code (kindly supplied
by Brian Sack) and ￿ne-tuning the nonlinear optimization procedure, we were able to obtain
a better ￿t to the data than BRS report in their paper, with root-mean-squared errors that
were about half as large even over the identical sample. Thus, we do not use the parameter
values as estimated by BRS, since we have found that the model can ￿t the data better than
originally reported. Moreover, because we are reestimating the parameters of the model, we
take the opportunity to extend the BRS estimation period through the end of 2005, which
has the added advantage of giving the model the best possible chance of ￿tting the recent
low ￿conundrum￿level of bond yields by ￿tting them in rather than out of the sample. In
every other respect, however, we have followed BRS in their analysis.
We estimate the BRS model on monthly macroeconomic and bond yield data over the
period from January 1984 to December 2005.7 Ideally, one would like to perform the esti-
mation over the whole postwar period, but the preponderance of empirical evidence suggests
that the relationships between interest rates and macroeconomic variables have not been
stable over the past 40 years. In particular, many authors (e.g., Fuhrer, 1996, Bernanke and
Mihov, 1998, and Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler, 2000) have found that there was an important
structural break in the conduct of monetary policy around 1980, when Paul Volcker became
Chairman of the Federal Reserve.8 As a result, macro-￿nance models estimated over the
entire postwar period would likely be subject to the Lucas critique, so we avoid this issue by
beginning our empirical estimation in January 1984, after the Volcker disin￿ ation, after the
structural breaks in monetary policy found by the authors above, and after the structural
break in U.S. GDP volatility found by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and others.
7 Because the VAR has four lags, this requires using macroeconomic data back to September 1983.
8 Evidence of a structural break in the conduct of monetary policy is also indirectly supported by the
greater stability of in￿ ation expectations that seem to have held in the U.S. in the 1990s and 2000s relative
to the 1970s.
11Following BRS, we use ￿ve macroeconomic variables as state variables of the model, which
are the a¢ ne factors for pricing bonds: the federal funds rate, the deviation of employment
from trend (where trend is measured using an HP ￿lter), the year-on-year percentage change
in the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) de￿ ator, the Blue Chip survey of
in￿ ation expectations for the upcoming year, and the rate on the eurodollar futures contract
with four quarters to expiration. The last variable in particular is included to capture
aspects of the stance of monetary policy that may not be adequately represented by the
current and past federal funds rate, employment gap, and in￿ ation alone, such as ￿nancial
market expectations for the future path of policy over the next 12 months. For example, the
￿de￿ ation scare￿episode in the U.S. in the summer of 2003 led the Federal Reserve to include
greater forward-looking language in its monetary policy announcements, such as the now-
famous ￿considerable period￿phrase,9 which helped to shape ￿nancial market expectations
for the future path of policy in a way that was perhaps di⁄erent from what the past behavior
of output, in￿ ation, and interest rates would have suggested. The inclusion of the four-
quarter-ahead eurodollar futures rate thus helps to capture changes in the expected future
path of policy that may not be adequately accounted for by the lags of the VAR. Similarly,
the inclusion of the Blue Chip in￿ ation expectations survey helps to capture changes in the
expected future course of in￿ ation that may not be adequately captured by the VAR. Of
course, the inclusion of these forward-looking expectational variables in the VAR creates
a tension or internal inconsistency between the forecast data series that are included as
variables and the forecasts that would be implied by the model itself based on the VAR.
Although this technical issue can be addressed by estimating the model in such a way as to
ensure consistency between the model and survey forecasts to the greatest extent possible
(see Swanson, 2006), doing so would require moving away from standard VAR estimation
procedures, which is beyond the scope of the present paper. Thus, we follow BRS and simply
estimate a VAR on all ￿ve of the macroeconomic time series above, and leave the issue of
9 On August 12, 2003, the FOMC released a statement that, although it was maintaining its federal funds
rate target at the level of 1 percent, the Committee judged ￿that, on balance, the risk of in￿ ation becoming
undesirably low is likely to be the predominant concern for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances,
the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period.￿
12consistency between model-based forecasts and forecast data to subsequent work.
Although the BRS model (and also the RW model) is linear in the state variables, the
model￿ s predictions for bond yields are highly nonlinear in the parameters (as are the impulse
response functions in a VAR, for example).10 Estimation of the bond-pricing implications of
the model is thus highly nonlinear and can be tricky in practice, with a great many local
minima. (Indeed, as noted above, by experimenting and exploring the parameter space, we
were able to obtain a better ￿t to the data than BRS report in their paper.) To reduce the
number of model parameters that must be estimated nonlinearly, we follow Ang, Piazzesi,
and Wei (2006) and BRS and estimate the model in two stages: First, we estimate the VAR
on the ￿ve macroeconomic time series above (with four lags) over the 1984￿ 2005 period by
ordinary least squares; and second, we take the VAR coe¢ cients as given and estimate the
stochastic pricing kernel factor loadings (which, between ￿0 and ￿1, comprise 30 parameters)
using nonlinear least squares to ￿t our bond yield data over the same period, 1984￿ 2005. As
in BRS, we estimate the model to match the 6-month and 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 7-, and 10-year
yields as closely as possible, with equal weight on ￿tting each of those maturities. These
yield curve data are continuously compounded zero-coupon yields estimated by the Federal
Reserve Board from o⁄-the-run Treasury coupon securities (for details, see G￿rkaynak, Sack,
and Wright, 2006); following BRS, we use the monthly average values of these yields.11
Our results from estimating the BRS model are reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3. The VAR
parameter estimates in Table 1 show that each variable in the VAR has a coe¢ cient near
unity on its own ￿rst lag, with smaller coe¢ cients on longer lags of itself and on lags of other
variables. The sum of the coe¢ cients on each variable￿ s own lags is near unity. For the federal
funds rate, the coe¢ cients suggest a hump-shaped impulse response and autocorrelation
functions, but the other variables exhibit impulse response and autocorrelation functions
10 Indeed, to compute the model-implied 10-year yield, we must project the monthly VAR and prices of
risk forward 120 months. Thus, when ￿tting the model to the data, we are essentially trying to minimize a
120th-degree polynomial.
11 The ￿nance and macro-￿nance literatures typically use end-of-month yield data rather than month-
average yields. However, the model is linear in the state variables, so it is completely consistent to view
the model￿ s equations as holding for the month-average data as well as the daily data and the end-of-month
data. Moreover, our macro data are typically monthly averages, so using month-average yields is arguably
more consistent with the macro data.
13that are closer to a geometric decay.
The BRS model￿ s estimated risk factor loadings are reported in Table 2. Although these
estimated loadings show the greatest coe¢ cients on the Blue Chip in￿ ation expectations
variable, that variable also has a relatively lower variance, as can be seen in Table 1, so the
net e⁄ect on bond prices is not as great as the factor loadings would suggest by themselves.12
Table 3 reports the quality of the model￿ s ￿t, in terms of root-mean-squared errors (RM-
SEs) for the eight points on the yield curve that the model was estimated against. Except
at the shortest horizons, these root-mean-squared errors are less than half as large as those
reported by BRS for their sample period. This di⁄erence is not simply due to the sample
period: even when we restrict our sample to the one used by BRS, we are able to obtain
RMSEs less than half as large by experimenting and exploring the parameter space.
3.1.2 RW Model Estimates
For the RW model, we take the original parameter values as estimated by Rudebusch and
Wu (2004) from January 1988 to December 2000 using monthly data. In that estimation,
the in￿ ation rate was measured by the year-on-year change in the overall PCE de￿ ator, the
output gap was measured by capacity utilization, and interest rates were end-of-month data
on ￿ve U.S. Treasury zero-coupon yields that have maturities of 1, 3, 12, 36, and 60 months
(yields are unsmoothed Fama-Bliss data expressed at an annual rate in percent).
Since there are two underlying latent factors but ￿ve observable yields, RW follow the
usual strategy and assume that the 3-, 12-, and 36-month yields are measured with i:i:d:
error, as in Ang and Piazzesi (2003). (Note that this implies that, for a given set of parameter
values, the latent factors Lt and St can be backed out perfectly from the observed 1-month
and 60-month bond yields.) The estimated size of the measurement error that is required to
￿t the other yields is a common metric for the quality of the model￿ s ￿t. Also note that the
10-year rate is not used in the estimation, so examining the recent episode of low bond rates
12 It would be desirable to perform a variance decomposition of the 10-year Treasury term premium on
the ￿ve stochastic shocks ". However, the term premium at these longer horizons is highly nonlinear in the
parameters of the model, so that a direct computation of the variance decomposition is impossible and the
delta-method is likely to be a very poor approximation.
14is an out-of-sample exercise in terms of both the estimation sample and bond maturity.
In contrast to the BRS model, all of the parameters of the RW model are estimated in
a single step by maximum likelihood. Table 4 reports the RW model parameter estimates,
from Rudebusch and Wu (2004). First, consider the dynamics of the factors. The factor Lt
is very persistent, with a ￿L estimate of 0.989, which implies a small but signi￿cant weight
on actual in￿ ation. The dynamics of St are also very persistent, but this persistence does
not come from partial adjustment since the ￿S estimate is a minuscule 0.026. Instead, St
responds with only a very short lag to output and in￿ ation shocks.
The persistence in St re￿ ects the fact that the Fed adjusts the short rate promptly to
various determinants￿ output, in￿ ation, and other in￿ uences in the residual ut￿ that are
themselves quite persistent (e.g., ￿u = 0:975).13 The monetary policy interpretation of
the slope factor is supported by the values of the estimated in￿ ation and output response
coe¢ cients, g￿ and gy, which are 1.25 and 0.20, respectively. These estimates are similar
to the usual single-equation estimates of the Taylor rule during this sample period (e.g.,
Rudebusch 2002b).
The estimated parameters describing the in￿ ation dynamics also appear reasonable.14
In particular, the estimated weight on explicit forward-looking expectations in determining
in￿ ation, ￿￿, is 0.074. Since this estimate is based on monthly data, with time aggregation, it
implies a weight of about 0.21 on the interim in￿ ation objective at a quarterly frequency. This
estimate appears consistent with many earlier estimates obtained using a variety of di⁄erent
methods and speci￿cations. For example, using survey data on expectations, Rudebusch
(2002a) obtains a broadly comparable ￿￿ estimate of 0.29, which is in the middle of the
range of estimates in the literature. However, by using the yield curve to extract in￿ ation
expectations, our estimates bring new information to bear on this important macroeconomic
13 Thus, our estimate of ￿S decisively dismisses the interest rate smoothing or monetary policy inertia
interpretation of the persistence in the short rate.
14 After taking into account time aggregation and the higher cyclical variability of capacity utilization
compared with the output gap, the elasticity of in￿ ation with respect to output (￿y = 0:014) appears about
half the size of estimates that use the entire postwar sample of quarterly data, for example, Rudebusch
(2002a). The estimate does appear more in line with estimates obtained in recent shorter samples (Rudebusch
2001).
15question.
The estimated parameters describing the output dynamics also fall within reasonable
ranges.15 Speci￿cally, the estimated value of ￿y = 0:009, implies a negligible weight at a
quarterly frequency on forward-looking output expectations in the determination of output
behavior. This is very much in accord with the maximum likelihood estimation results
reported by Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004).
The risk price matrix (￿1) appears signi￿cant, and the model ￿ts the 3-month, 12-month,
and 36-month yields with measurement error standard deviations comparable to others in
the literature. For instance, the standard deviation of the 3-month yield is 28 basis points
(bp) (annualized), compared with 30 bp in the VAR-based ￿macro lag model￿in Ang and
Piazzesi (2003). The standard deviation of the 36-month yield is 13 bp, same as in Ang and
Piazzesi (2003).
To consider the bond yield ￿conundrum￿in 2004￿ 2005, we must extend the RW model
forward to include this period. We do so as follows. As mentioned above, we take the
parameter values as estimated from Rudebusch and Wu (2004). We then extend the output
gap and in￿ ation data forward to the end of 2005. For consistency with our BRS model
analysis, we use the continuously compounded zero-coupon yield curve data from the Federal
Reserve Board for the period January 1988 to December 2005 (although we use the month-
end values of these data rather than the month-average). From the 1-month and 5-year
zero-coupon yields, we can back out the RW model￿ s level and slope factors, Lt and St, over
the extended sample 1988￿ 2005, as noted above. (Over the period 1988-2000, these agree
closely with the original values for Lt and St in RW, but they are not identical.) Having
obtained Lt and St over the full sample, and given the parameters of the model as estimated
by RW, we can then compute the model￿ s implications for bond yields of all maturities from
1988￿ 2005.
15 The interest rate sensitivity of output (￿r = 0:089), after taking into account the time aggregation and
the use of capacity utilization rather than the output gap, appears broadly in line with estimates that use
the entire postwar sample of quarterly data.
163.2 Macro-Finance Model Analysis of the 10-year Treasury Yield
Before analyzing the recent episode of bond yields within the framework of the macro-￿nance
models above, it may be useful to summarize the salient di⁄erences between the two models.
Our estimates of the BRS model use monthly average interest rate data and include the 2004-
2005 period in the estimation sample. The RW estimates use end-of-month interest rate data
and are based on a sample that ends in 2000. (The in-sample/out-of-sample distinction is
reinforced because the BRS model includes the 10-year yield in the estimation while the RW
model does not.) The BRS model is a completely autoregressive, nonstructural speci￿cation
(except for the no-arbitrage assumption), while the RW model is more tightly parameterized
with identi￿able, explicitly forward-looking aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and policy
rule equations. As an indication of the di⁄erences in parameterization, the BRS model has
100 parameters describing the factor dynamics and 25 risk-pricing parameters, excluding
constants, while the RW model has 13 and 4, respectively. Again, we view these di⁄erences
between the two models as useful to the extent they can illuminate the robustness of our
results.
To start our analysis, we plot the 10-year zero-coupon U.S. Treasury yield together with
the decomposition of that yield into its constituent components, as implied by the BRS and
RW macro-￿nance models, in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. We focus on the 10-year yield in
particular because that yield was the benchmark for long-term interest rates in the U.S. over
the period of interest and because discussions of the long-term bond yield ￿conundrum￿by
policymakers and in the popular press have often focused on the 10-year U.S. Treasury in
particular.
In the top panel of Figure 1, we plot the zero-coupon U.S. Treasury yield from 1984
through 2005 together with the BRS model decomposition of that yield. The BRS model-
implied risk-neutral rate (the blue line) is the model￿ s estimated yield on a riskless 10-year
zero-coupon bond at each date t in a hypothetical world in which the prices of risk ￿t are
always equal to zero and the state variables of the economy are governed by the VAR in
Table 1. The BRS model-implied 10-year Treasury yield (the orange dashed line in Figure 1)
17is the model￿ s estimated value of the same 10-year zero-coupon bond when the prices of risk
￿t are no longer zero, but are instead the estimated a¢ ne function of the macroeconomic
variables given in Table 2. The BRS model-implied term premium (the red line) is the
di⁄erence between the orange dashed line and the blue line, and can be interpreted as the
model￿ s estimate of the risk or term premium on the 10-year zero-coupon bond at each date
t. Finally, the BRS model does not match the data perfectly, so the model￿ s residuals￿ the
di⁄erence between the model predictions (the orange dashed line) and the data (the black
line)￿ are graphed in the bottom panel of Figure 1.
As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 1, the close ￿t of the BRS model to the data
is striking. Not only does the model capture the general downward trend in the 10-year
yield over this period, but even the high-frequency swings in this yield in the late 1980s and
mid-1990s are matched extremely well. The ￿t is even more remarkable in light of the fact
that the model was not optimized to ￿t the 10-year yield, but rather placed equal weight on
eight maturities all along the term structure.
According to the model, both the risk-neutral 10-year yield and the term premium have
fallen over our sample, with the fall in the term premium being somewhat more important.
According to the model, the risk-neutral yield has fallen about 250 bp over this period while
the term premium has fallen about 350 bp, and the term premium has fallen from about
one-half of the total 10-year U.S. Treasury yield in the 1980s to about one-third of that yield
more recently.
However, despite the model￿ s excellent ￿t to the data overall, the recent period of low
10-year yields is one episode that the model notably fails to ￿t. The model￿ s residuals from
mid-2004 through the end of 2005 have typically been around 50 bp, and have been even
greater over almost all of 2005. Although the model has failed to ￿t the data on a few other
occasions as well￿ most notably at the end of 1984, in 1985, and from 1997 to 1999￿ these
previous episodes were typically either much briefer (late 1984) or milder in size (1997 to
1999) than the latest episode. Indeed, the most recent episode￿ s residuals of 50 to 75 bp
are even more remarkable in light of the very low level of long-term yields￿ thus, while the
18model￿ s residuals amounted to about one-tenth the level of the 10-year Treasury yield in
1984 and 1985, and about one-￿fteenth in 1997￿ 1998, the model￿ s residuals have been about
one-sixth the level of the 10-year Treasury yield in the most recent period.
In Figure 2, we present the analogous pair of graphs for the 10-year bond yield decom-
position implied by the RW model. Again, the ￿t of the model to the data is excellent, and
this is all the more remarkable given that the RW model was not optimized to ￿t the 10-year
yield at all￿ indeed, RW in their paper chose the 5-year yield as the longest maturity in the
estimation.
A striking observation from Figures 1 and 2 is that, although both the RW and BRS
macro-￿nance models produce very high quality forecasts of the 10-year Treasury yield, the
2 models￿implied decomposition of that yield into expected short rate and term premium
components is very di⁄erent. In the RW model, the term premium is relatively constant over
the 1988￿ 2005 period, hovering around the 2 percent level with very little high-frequency
variation; instead, the RW model attributes most of the variation in the 10-year bond yield
over time to changes in the expected future path of short rates. By contrast, the BRS
model attributes most of the high-frequency variation in the 10-year yield to changes in
the term premium component, with the risk-neutral component generally trending smoothly
downward over time.
Why is the decomposition implied by the two models so di⁄erent? Recall that the
BRS model is estimated in two stages, with the macroeconomic VAR estimated ￿rst. The
smoothly downward-trending risk-neutral rate in the BRS model is essentially a projection of
the future path of short rates based on the VAR, so the VAR in the BRS model is implying a
smoother path for the risk-neutral 10-year yield than is the case for the actual 10-year yield
in the data. By contrast, in the RW model, the future path of short-term interest rates is
a⁄ected greatly by the in￿ ation ￿level￿factor Lt. Since Lt can vary at high frequency in
response to exogenous shocks to itself and to in￿ ation, the RW model￿ s speci￿cation allows
these shocks to pass essentially directly through to the risk-neutral 10-year yield, leading to
signi￿cant high-frequency variation in that variable.
19The high-frequency variation in the risk-neutral 10-year yield that is allowed for (but
not assumed) by the RW model is arguably one of its strengths￿ indeed, G￿rkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2005) found signi￿cant systematic variation in far-ahead forward nominal
interest rates in response to macroeconomic news in a way that suggested changes in in￿ ation
expectations rather than changes in term premiums. Similarly, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001)
found that statistical models that allow for a ￿moving endpoint￿ are able to ￿t interest
rate and in￿ ation time series much better than standard stationary or di⁄erence-stationary
VARs. A weakness of the BRS model and many other macroeconomic models, according to
both of these papers, is that those models assume long-run features of the economy, such as
the steady-state real interest rate and rate of in￿ ation, are too well-anchored in response to
shocks. The RW model relaxes that restriction to a much greater extent than does the BRS
model.16
4 Factors That May Underlie the Conundrum
According to the BRS and RW macro-￿nance models, the recent behavior of long-term in-
terest rates does present us with something of a conundrum. In this section, we investigate
whether there are any additional factors that lie outside of the two models that could po-
tentially explain this episode of unusually low long-term bond yields. One could of course
search for correlations between our macro-￿nance model residuals and nonlinear functions
of the variables that are already included in the model, such as the output gap, in￿ ation,
and the federal funds rate. We focus instead on searching for variables outside of the models
because we do not have particularly strong priors that nonlinearities in the above variables
have played an important role in the U.S. long-term Treasury market recently, while there
are many plausible candidate variables that have been omitted from the model (a number
16 The VAR in the BRS model is not restricted to be stationary, and thus the BRS model does allow for
an unanchored steady-state to the extent that the model estimates a unit root. Nonetheless, the estimation
of the VAR is based on the high-frequency dynamics of the system￿ using four lags of monthly data￿ rather
than on the behavior of long-term bond yields, and the high-frequency dynamics of the model may not speak
so strongly in favor of a unit root as do long-term bond yields or other more direct measures of the long-term
implications of the model.
20of which have been emphasized in the ￿nancial press).
We ￿rst brie￿ y review various explanations for the conundrum that have been discussed
in the literature, and then provide some empirical analysis based on the estimated macro-
￿nance models in order to help assess the importance of the various factors.
4.1 Popular Explanations for Low Long-Term Bond Yields
A large number of possible candidate explanations for low bond yields have been discussed by
￿nancial analysts. A simple means to summarize this set of explanations (and to some extent
limit consideration to the most important ones) is to examine a survey of bond traders, hedge
fund managers, and business economists conducted by the ￿rm Macroeconomic Advisers.
Their survey was taken in early March 2005 and asked participants to provide their views
on the importance of various factors that might explain the low level of the 10-year Treasury
yield. Table 5 displays the seven most important factors that were identi￿ed as holding
down bond yields as well as a rough estimate of how much each factor was judged by survey
respondents to have reduced the bond yield (in basis points).17 The largest e⁄ect by far was
attributed to increased demand for U.S. longer-term securities from foreign central banks.
Indeed, on average, the survey respondents thought that purchases by foreign central banks
had lowered U.S. long-term rates by 21 bp.18
After foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S. Treasuries, survey respondents assigned about
equal importance to the other factors in Table 5, with each factor accounting for 7 to 11 bp
of lower long-term rates. For example, an increased demand for long bonds in light of the
greater likelihood of future corporate pension fund reform in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and elsewhere was assigned an importance of about 11 bp. Such reforms would
likely encourage pension funds to better match the duration of their assets to their liabilities,
17 Several other factors (such as increased demand by holders of mortgage-backed securities) were often
noted in the survey but were assessed to have an e⁄ect of only a few basis points and are excluded from the
table.
18 In the academic literature, Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2005) and Warnock and Warnock (2005)
have also stressed the importance of the recent increases in foreign central bank purchases, especially by
East Asian countries. Wu (2005), however, notes that ￿nding signi￿cant e⁄ects of such purchases on U.S.
Treasury yields is sensitive to the sample period and can be quite elusive.
21which is expected to boost demand for long-term bonds.19 Although this factor has been
widely cited (e.g., Bank for International Settlements 2005), it is di¢ cult to quantify, and
we do not include it in our empirical analysis below.
Similarly, we do not quantify two factors that appear to relate to shifts in investor ap-
petite for risk. These include the factor, ￿reaching for yield,￿which is shorthand for the
view that high levels of liquidity had encouraged investors to reduce their aversion to risk
(perhaps irrationally in an almost bubble-like manner). Also, a closely related factor is the
view that excess global saving￿ the global saving glut hypothesis of Bernanke noted in the
introduction￿ stemming perhaps from less home bias among foreign investors or rapid eco-
nomic growth in countries with high saving rates, had boosted foreign demand for bonds
generally (e.g., Warnock and Warnock 2005).
We do however employ some proxies that try to measure a possible decrease in the
amount of risk that investors may feel they face. Indeed, the Macroeconomic Advisers
survey respondents pointed to lower uncertainty as an important factor in three of their
responses: minimal in￿ ation risk, greater transparency of the Fed (which presumably would
translate into lower short-term interest rate uncertainty), and low economic growth volatility.
Taken together, these three factors suggest a very important role for reduced macroeconomic
uncertainty in reducing the long-term bond rate.
4.2 An Empirical Assessment of Various Explanations
To examine some popular explanations for low long-term bond yields, we consider six vari-
ables excluded from the BRS and RW macro-￿nance models: three measures of ￿nancial
market volatility, two measures of macroeconomic volatility, and one measure of interna-
tional capital ￿ ows. For ￿nancial market volatility, we use the Merrill-Lynch MOVE Index
to measure the implied volatility in the longer-term U.S. Treasury market;20 we use the im-
19 These demands for duration would, of course, reach out much longer than a 10-year horizon, and indeed
in 2005 there was strong demand for the revived 30-year U.S. Treasury bond, for a newly launched French
50-year bond issue, and for a 50-year British in￿ ation-indexed bond.
20 The Merill Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index reports the average implied volatility across a
wide range of outstanding options on the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year, and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities (with
22plied volatility from eurodollar options to measure uncertainty about the near-term path of
monetary policy;21 and we use the VIX measure of implied volatility from options on the
S&P 500 index to measure uncertainty in the stock market. For macroeconomic uncertainty,
we proxy for output uncertainty by using the eight-quarter trailing standard deviation of the
growth rate of real GDP, interpolating between the resulting quarterly volatility measure to
get a monthly series, and we proxy for in￿ ation uncertainty by using the 24-month trailing
standard deviation of core PCE de￿ ator in￿ ation. Finally, we proxy for foreign government
and foreign central bank purchases of U.S. Treasury securities by using the 12-month change
in the custodial holdings by the New York Fed for all foreign o¢ cial institutions (and we
normalize this series by the total stock of U.S. Treasury debt in the hands of the public).22
All of these series are natural candidates for omitted variables that could be impacting
the level of long-term U.S. Treasury yields. For example, reduced volatility in long-term bond
markets would tend to make those securities more attractive relative to other assets and drive
long-term bond yields down, all else equal. Conversely, a reduced degree of uncertainty
about stock returns would tend to drive the prices of stocks up and might require long-
term interest rates to rise in order to keep ￿xed-income securities attractive by comparison.
Reduced uncertainty about the future path of monetary policy may lower the riskiness of
holding long-term bonds leading to a fall in long-term yields. Reduced uncertainty about
in￿ ation may make ￿xed income securities of all maturities more attractive, and reduced
uncertainty about output may lower the risk premium and raise the prices of all risky assets
in general. Finally, inelastic demand by foreign central banks and governments for long-term
a total weight of 40 percent on the 10-year Treasury and total weights of 20 percent each on the other
maturities). Note that the options underlying the MOVE Index have expiration dates of approximately one
month; thus, the MOVE index measures the implied volatility of long-term yields over a relatively short
horizon. Such short-term uncertainty about long-maturity yields may be related but is not the same as
uncertainty about the path of short-term interest rates in the distant future.
21 Speci￿cally, we use the closest to at-the-money eurodollar option with expiration in six months￿time
to measure the implied volatility for the 90-day eurodollar rate.
22 The idea that the available quantity of long-term U.S. Treasury securities matters for long-term yields
suggests that we should also look at total issuance of marketable U.S. Treasury securities by the U.S.
government as well as the purchases of those securities by foreign governments. In preliminary results not
reported here, we do ￿nd evidence that greater total issuance of marketable U.S. Treasuries does lead to
higher long-term interest rates (Bikbov and Chernov, 2006, also ￿nd a correlation between total issuance
of U.S. Treasuries and their macro-￿nance model residuals). Even when we include total issuance as an
explanatory variable in our regressions below, however, we ￿nd little evidence that foreign o¢ cial purchases
have had a signi￿cant impact on long-term Treasury yields.
23U.S. Treasury securities has often been cited in the popular press (and in Warnock-Warnock,
2005) as a reason why yields on those securities have been so low recently.
Graphs of each of these six variables over the 1984￿ 2005 sample are presented in Figure
3 (note that not all of the above series, particularly the implied volatility series for ￿nancial
market data, are available before about 1989). It is immediately clear from the ￿gure that
many of these series show a marked dip in the last few years￿ thus, as readers of the ￿nancial
press are well aware, there is no shortage of possible explanations for the conundrum!
In Table 6, we conduct a preliminary statistical analysis of the importance of these
variables by regressing the residuals from the BRS model and the RW model on each of the
six independent variables described above, in a set of univariate regressions. A signi￿cant
correlation between one of these variables and the models￿residuals would suggest that that
variable is perhaps an important determinant of long-term U.S. Treasury yields that has not
been captured by the model.23
As can be seen in Table 6, and as was evident in Figure 3, many of the variables above
are correlated with the models￿residuals. Indeed, ￿ve of the six variables are statistically
signi￿cant at the 10 percent level for at least one of the two models￿residuals. Two of the six
variables￿ implied volatility on long-term Treasuries and GDP volatility￿ are statistically
signi￿cant at the 5 percent level or better for both models￿residuals. Interestingly, foreign
o¢ cial purchases of U.S. Treasuries￿ the variable that is most emphasized by the ￿nancial
press and by the Macroeconomic Advisers survey respondents￿ is the only one of the six
variables that is not signi￿cant at even the 10 percent level for at least one of the two sets of
model residuals (and has a positive sign, rather than the negative correlation hypothesized
by the press). This result is very similar to that of Wu (2005), who ￿nds that, after control-
ling for macroeconomic determinants of bond yields, the correlation between foreign o¢ cial
23 The purpose of these regressions is to help identify which variables might potentially be the most
important to incorporate into the models going forward. Of course, just because a variable is signi￿cantly
contemporaneously correlated with our macro-￿nance model residuals does not necessarily imply that it
will remain signi￿cant when fully incorporated into a macro-￿nance framework, although we interpret a
strong contemporaneous correlation as suggestive that it will be. Also, there is no guarantee that our
macro-￿nance model residuals are orthogonal even to the variables included in the models because of the
overidentifying restrictions those models impose. We interpret the regression results under the assumption
that the overidentifying model restrictions are correct, although again, we consider both models in order to
provide some assurance of robustness.
24purchases and bond yields is signi￿cantly positive between 1987 and 2000, and negative only
since 2002. Thus, the correlation that has been emphasized so much by the ￿nancial press
is not one that has been consistent over recent history.
A primary problem with Table 6, of course, is that many of the variables show declines in
2004 and 2005, and thus univariate regression results may be double-counting the explanatory
power of the variables for the conundrum. Table 7 thus reports results from multivariate
regressions for the same variables over the May 1990 to December 2005 period (the longest
sample for which we have data on all six explanatory variables).
The multivariate regression results in Table 7 are, for the most part, consistent with
the univariate regression results in Table 6. The most signi￿cant and robust explanatory
variable is the implied volatility on longer-term Treasuries. Macroeconomic volatility also
seems to play a statistically signi￿cant role, with core PCE in￿ ation volatility signi￿cant
at the 5 percent level for both models￿residuals, and GDP growth volatility signi￿cant for
the BRS model residuals. The signs of these coe¢ cients are also what one would typically
expect, with lower implied volatility on Treasuries and lower realized volatility of output
and in￿ ation all being correlated with lower yields on long-term Treasury securities. Again,
foreign o¢ cial purchases is the only variable that is not statistically signi￿cant at the 10
percent level for at least one of the two models￿residuals, and continues to have a positive
sign.
4.3 Decomposition of the Bond Yield Conundrum
How much of the bond yield conundrum can these additional variables explain? In Table 8,
we perform a detailed decomposition of the decline in bond yields from June 2004 to June
2005, according to each of the BRS and RW models and the regression results from Table
7. We choose June 2004 as the starting point for the change in yields because that month,
when the FOMC embarked on the removal of monetary accommodation, is most often cited
as the beginning of the conundrum. During this period, long-term interest rates edged down
as the Fed steadily tightened policy.
25The ￿rst line of Table 8 reports the actual change in 10-year yields over the June 2004
to June 2005 period (which di⁄ers slightly across the BRS and RW models because the
BRS model uses month-average yield data while the RW model uses end-of-month yields),
amounting to a fall of about 90 bp. Both the BRS and RW models imply that only a small
part of this change￿ about 20 to 25 bp￿ can be attributed to changes in the term premiums
(line 3). Moreover, the BRS model even predicts that risk-neutral long-term yields should
have risen about 13 bp (line 2), based on the improving outlooks for GDP and in￿ ation.
Thus, the decline in long-term yields from June 2004 to June 2005 is largely unexplained by
both the BRS and RW models, with changes in the models￿residuals (line 4) accounting for
about 87 and 32 bp of the roughly 90 bp fall in yields from June 2004 to June 2005.
Lines 5￿ 10 of Table 8 decompose the BRS and RW model residuals into the parts that are
explained by each of the six variables in the previous section, according to the regressions
in Table 7 multiplied by the change in each independent variable over the June 2004 to
June 2005 period. Not surprisingly, the fall in implied volatility on longer-term Treasuries
from June 2004 to June 2005 accounts for the greatest fraction of the two models￿residuals,
explaining a little over one-third of the residuals of each model. More surprisingly, the change
in core PCE de￿ ator in￿ ation volatility over this period accounts for essentially none of the
conundrum, even though it was statistically signi￿cant in Table 7. Apparently, the change
in in￿ ation volatility from 2004 to 2005 was close to zero and even slightly positive, so that
the conundrum period played little role in the statistcal signi￿cance of the results for that
variable in Table 7. The fall in GDP volatility from 2004 to 2005 seems to have played a
more important role, accounting for about one-eighth (12 bp) of the BRS model residuals
and about one-tenth (3 bp) of the RW model residuals. The remaining three variables in
Table 8 were not statistically signi￿cant in the previous section and account for relatively
small changes in yields over the conundrum period.
As can be seen in the last line of Table 8, even the six omitted variables studied in the
previous section can explain only about one-fourth to, at most, one-half of the BRS and
RW model residuals. Thus, we have by no means found the missing link that explains the
26bond yield conundrum, but we have found evidence that reductions in longer-term Treasury
volatility probably have played an important role, and that foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S.
Treasuries probably have not.
5 Conclusions
We draw a number of conclusions from the above analysis. First, the low level of long-term
bond yields in the U.S. during the 2004￿ 2005 period does appear to be a conundrum when
viewed through a macro-￿nance lens. Speci￿cally, neither of the two macro-￿nance empirical
models we consider is able to explain the recent low level of, or the fall in, long-term bond
yields. This ￿nding is remarkabe given that both models ￿t the earlier long-term yield data
quite well. Therefore, the conundrum can likely only be explained with variables that lie
outside of our baseline macro-￿nance models. Of the six such variables that we consider,
it is declines in the (short-run implied) volatility of long-term Treasury yields that seem to
have played the most important role. Even so, at best, almost two-thirds of the conundrum
remains unexplained.
Interestingly, we ￿nd that the explanation for the conundrum emphasized by ￿nancial
market participants￿ namely, large-scale purchases of long-term Treasuries by foreign central
banks￿ has essentially no explanatory power for the conundrum episode. This discrepancy
may re￿ ect a di⁄erence between unconditional and conditional correlations. In particular,
long-term Treasury yields have been declining steadily over time, and foreign o¢ cial holdings
and purchases of U.S. Treasuries have been rising steadily; thus, the unconditional correlation
suggests a substantial negative e⁄ect. In contrast, a macro-￿nance econometric framework
attributes the downward trend in long-term yields largely to declining current and future
projected levels of in￿ ation. After controlling for such factors, the residuals from our two
baseline macro-￿nance models have no signi￿cant correlation with foreign o¢ cial purchases
of U.S. Treasuries.
Of course, this leaves us with about two-thirds of the bond yield conundrum yet to be
27explained, to say nothing of the similar or perhaps even more extreme behavior of long-term
yields in other countries, such as Germany and Japan. The resolution of these ￿conundrum￿
epsiodes, in the U.S. and abroad, presents a rich frontier for future research.
28Table 1: Bernanke-Reinhart-Sack VAR Parameter Estimates
VAR coe¢ cient estimates (￿)
yt ￿t b ￿
BC
t it b ied
t
yt￿1 1:078 0:078 ￿0:080 0:027 0:266
yt￿2 0:171 0:138 0:228 0:123 0:254
yt￿3 ￿0:102 0:062 ￿0:055 ￿0:038 ￿0:283
yt￿4 ￿0:180 ￿0:249 ￿0:094 ￿0:103 ￿0:278
￿t￿1 0:022 0:883 0:059 0:170 0:311
￿t￿2 ￿0:036 ￿0:067 ￿0:012 ￿0:141 ￿0:033
￿t￿3 ￿0:071 0:187 0:001 ￿0:000 ￿0:234
￿t￿4 0:073 ￿0:016 0:026 ￿0:012 ￿0:068
b ￿
BC
t￿1 ￿0:094 0:083 1:027 0:078 ￿0:104
b ￿
BC
t￿2 0:273 ￿0:086 ￿0:118 ￿0:174 0:208
b ￿
BC
t￿3 ￿0:239 0:124 ￿0:021 0:341 0:222
b ￿
BC
t￿4 0:063 ￿0:114 0:005 ￿0:263 ￿0:190
it￿1 0:010 ￿0:107 0:089 1:311 0:105
it￿2 0:070 0:120 ￿0:130 ￿0:413 ￿0:310
it￿3 ￿0:092 ￿0:106 0:098 0:177 0:367
it￿4 0:018 0:093 ￿0:054 ￿0:115 ￿0:073
b ied
t￿1 0:029 ￿0:007 0:064 0:162 1:097
b ied
t￿2 ￿0:005 0:007 ￿0:071 ￿0:065 ￿0:264
b ied
t￿3 ￿0:020 ￿0:043 0:017 ￿0:029 0:139
b ied
t￿4 ￿0:003 0:036 ￿0:004 ￿0:034 ￿0:119
constant ￿0:006 0:039 0:046 0:006 0:087
Cholesky-factored residual variance (￿) (Var = ￿￿0)
:0867 0 0 0 0
:0034 :1618 0 0 0
￿:0001 :0111 :0808 0 0
:0047 ￿:0105 :0168 :1539 0
:0800 :0309 :0283 :1150 :3826
29Table 2: Bernanke-Reinhart-Sack Model Risk Factor Loadings
￿0 ￿1
￿1:998 0:473 0:290 ￿1:292 2:517 0:209
￿2:349 0:712 0:666 6:036 ￿2:022 0:256
￿20:822 13:846 ￿0:323 1:028 4:941 12:002
3:366 ￿1:814 0:019 ￿0:287 ￿0:939 ￿1:720
2:525 ￿1:064 ￿0:465 ￿1:174 ￿0:030 ￿1:186
Table 3: Bernanke-Reinhart-Sack Model Prediction Errors











30Table 4: Rudebusch-Wu Model Parameter Estimates
Factor dynamics
￿L 0.989 (0.0068) g￿ 1.253 (0.0066)
￿S 0.026 (0.0111) gy 0.200 (0.0066)
￿u 0.975 (0.0062)
In￿ ation dynamics
￿￿ 0.074 (0.0113) ￿￿1 1.154 (0.0525)
￿y 0.014 (0.0074) ￿￿2 -0.155 (0.0066)
Output dynamics
￿y 0.009 (0.0066) ￿y1 0.918 (0.0604)
￿r 0.089 (0.0067) ￿y2 0.078 (0.0066)
Risk price (￿1)
Lt St
￿L;t -0.0045 (0.0068) 0.0168 (0.0068)
￿S;t -0.0223 (0.0064) 0.0083 (0.0067)
Standard deviations
￿L 0.342 (0.0089) ￿￿ 0.238 (0.0110)
￿S 0.559 (0.0313) ￿y 0.603 (0.0128)




Note: Standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses.
31Table 5: Survey Respondents￿Assessments of Factors
Holding Down the 10-Year Treasury Yield
Factor a⁄ecting yields E⁄ect in basis points
Demand by foreign central banks 21
Increased demand by pension funds 11
￿Reaching for yield￿ 10
Minimal in￿ ation risk 10
Greater transparency of the Fed 8
Excess global savings 8
Low economic growth volatility 7
Source: A survey of clients by Macroeconomic Advisers as reported in the newsletter ￿Monetary
Policy Insight￿ s Survey on Long-Term Interest Rates,￿March 8, 2005.
32Table 6: Univariate Regressions of BRS and RW Model Residuals
Independent variable Model Sample Coe⁄. t-stat. R2
Implied volatility on longer-term Treasury BRS 4/88￿ 12/05 1:10 7:83 :23
Securities (Merrill-Lynch MOVE Index) RW 4/88￿ 12/05 0:38 4:94 :10
Implied volatility on six-month-ahead BRS 1/89￿ 12/05 :278 3:17 :05
eurodollar futures (from options, in bp) RW 1/89￿ 12/05 :042 0:95 :00
Implied volatility on S&P 500 BRS 1/90￿ 12/05 :814 1:85 :02
(VIX index) RW 1/90￿ 12/05 :049 0:23 :00
Realized volatility of quarterly GDP growth BRS 1/88￿ 12/05 20:3 4:25 :08
(trailing 8-quarter standard deviation, in %) RW 1/88￿ 12/05 5:7 2:26 :02
Realized volatility of monthly core PCE price BRS 1/88￿ 12/05 316 2:33 :02
Ii￿ ation (trailing 24-mo. std. dev., in %) RW 1/88￿ 12/05 99 1:41 :01
Foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S. Treasury BRS 5/90￿ 12/05 149 0:89 :00
securities (trailing 12-mo. total, as % of RW 5/90￿ 12/05 47 0:58 :00
U.S. debt in hands of public)
Note: BRS and RW model residuals are in basis points. Sample period start dates di⁄er owing
to di⁄erences in data availability for each explanatory variable. Each regression also includes a
constant term (not reported).
33Table 7: Multivariate Regressions of BRS and RW Model Residuals
BRS Model RW Model
Independent variable Coe⁄. (t-stat) Coe⁄. (t-stat)
Implied volatility on longer-term Treasury 1:203 (5:47) 0:490 (4:11)
securities (Merrill-Lynch MOVE index)
Implied volatility on six-month-ahead ￿0:229 (￿1:35) ￿0:168 (￿1:83)
eurodollar futures (from options, in bp)
Implied volatility on S&P 500 ￿0:334 (￿0:63) ￿0:497 (￿1:73)
(VIX index)
Realized volatility of quarterly GDP growth 15:4 (3:10) 3:9 (1:45)
(trailing 8-quarter standard deviation, in %)
Realized volatility of monthly core PCE price 360 (2:18) 214 (2:39)
in￿ ation (trailing 24-mo. std. dev., in %)
Foreign o¢ cial purchases of U.S. Treasury 147 (0:76) 38 (0:04)
securities (trailing 12-mo. total, as % of
U.S. debt in hands of public)
R2 :30 .14
Note: BRS and RW model residuals are in basis points. Sample: May 1990 to December 2005.
Each regression also includes a constant term (not reported).
34Table 8: Decomposition of Long-Term Bond Yield Conundrum
BRS model RW model
1. Observed change in 10-year yield (bp), 6/04￿ 6/05 ￿93:3 ￿87:0
of which:
2. model-implied change in risk-neutral 10-year yield 13:1 ￿29:6
3. model-implied change in term premium ￿19:9 ￿25:2
4. change in model residuals ￿86:5 ￿32:2
of which:
5. change in implied volatility on longer-term Treasuries ￿29:9 ￿12:2
6. change in realized volatility of core PCE in￿ ation 1:1 0:7
7. change in realized volatility of GDP growth ￿11:6 ￿2:9
8. change in implied volatility of eurodollar rate 7:0 5:1
9. change in implied volatility of S&P 500 1:2 1:7
10. change in foreign o¢ cial purchases ￿6:0 ￿1:6
11. unexplained by above ￿48:6 ￿23:0
Note: Line 1 denotes the change in observed zero-coupon 10-year Treasury yields from June 2004
to June 2005; the values di⁄er across the BRS and RW models because the BRS model uses month-
average yield data while the RW model uses end-of-month data. Lines 2￿ 4 are the decompositions
implied by the BRS and RW macro-￿nance models, graphed in ￿gures 1 and 2. Lines 5￿ 10 are the
changes implied by the regression coe¢ cients in Table 7 applied to the change in each independent
variable from June 2004 to June 2005. Line 11 is the di⁄erence between line 4 and the sum of lines
5￿ 10.
35Figure 1: 10-year Treasury Yield and BRS Model Implied Values
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36Figure 2: 10-year Treasury Yield and RW Model Implied Values






































model-implied risk-neutral 10-yr yld
model-implied 10-yr term premium
model-implied 10-yr Treasury yield




























































































37Figure 3: Explanatory Variables for BRS and RW Model Residuals





















































































































































































Note: Not all data series available back to 1984.
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